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AbstrACt
Introduction There is only limited and conflicting 
evidence on the effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance 
(P4P) programmes, although they might have the potential 
to improve guideline adherence and quality of care. 
We therefore aim to test a P4P intervention in Swiss 
primary care practices focusing on quality indicators (QI) 
achievement in the treatment of patients with diabetes.
Methods and analysis This is a cluster-randomised, 
two-armed intervention study with the primary care 
practice as unit of randomisation. The control group will 
receive bimonthly feedback reports containing last data 
of blood pressure and glycated haemoglobin (HbA1c) 
measurements. The intervention group will additionally be 
informed about a financial incentive for each percentage 
point improved in QI achievement. Primary outcomes 
are differences in process (measurement of HbA1c) 
and clinical QI (blood pressure control) between the two 
groups. Furthermore, we investigate the effect on non-
incentivised QIs and on sustainability of the financial 
incentives. Swiss primary care practices participating in 
the FIRE (Family Medicine ICPC Research using Electronic 
Medical Record) research network are eligible for 
participation. The FIRE database consists of anonymised 
structured medical routine data from Swiss primary care 
practices. According to power calculations, 70 of the 
general practitioners contributing to the database will be 
randomised in either of the groups.
Ethics and dissemination According to the Local Ethics 
Committee of the Canton of Zurich, the project does not 
fall under the scope of the law on human research and 
therefore no ethical consent is necessary. Results will be 
published in a peer-reviewed journal.
trial registration number ISRCTN13305645; Pre-results.
IntroduCtIon
Evidence regarding Pay-for-Performance 
(P4P) programmes is inconclusive. However, 
P4P interventions might be an interesting 
approach to improve adherence to guidelines 
and quality of care in primary care. Effective-
ness of P4P programmes highly depends on 
different factors: study type (randomised 
controlled trial (RCT), before after 
design and interrupted time series), investi-
gated quality indicator (QI) (process versus 
clinical variables), type of healthcare system 
(gate keeping versus non-gate keeping), 
study participants (large-scale community 
clinics versus single-handed primary care 
practices), patient selection (socioeconomic 
status, multimorbidity and insurance type) 
and the method and level of payment.1–3 
In a gate keeping healthcare system such 
as the National Health System (NHS) of the 
UK, the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(QOF) introduced financial incentives for 
evidence-based QI in primary care. Subse-
quently, achievements with regard to all QIs 
increased.4 Since the QOF was a nationwide 
pretrial/post-trial without control group, it 
remains controversial to which extent the 
P4P programme or the increasing guide-
line adherence over time was responsible 
for this improvement. Evidence from P4P 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This randomised controlled trial (RCT) will allow to 
directly observe the impact of a financial incentive 
on evidence-based quality indicators (QIs) in pa-
tients with diabetes, comparing both process and 
clinical QIs.
 ► The secondary outcomes of this study are not di-
rectly targeted by financial incentives, in order to as-
sess the indirect impact of the Pay-for-Performance 
programme on cardiovascular risk in patients with 
diabetes.
 ► We chose the study population of diabetic patients, 
since diabetes is highly prevalent and is associated 
with high morbidity, mortality and costs.
 ► The database of the Swiss FIRE (Family Medicine 
ICPC Research using Electronic Medical Records) 
project is the first and, to date, only database of clin-
ical routine data in Swiss primary care.
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programmes in a different healthcare setting such as 
the USA has shown to be conflicting.2 5–7 RCTs from 
countries outside of Europe and the USA have shown 
positive effects of certain P4P interventions.8–11 A 
systematic review12 concludes that financial incen-
tives targeting indicators that can be directly altered 
by providers (eg, the number of measurements) have 
shown greater effects than financial incentives targeting 
indicators that can only be indirectly influenced (eg, 
blood pressure values).
In Switzerland, no data on the P4P approach exists 
and the role of QIs, especially in primary care, has been 
marginal. The main reason might be that—in contrast 
to the UK for example—documentation in primary 
care is still mainly paper based instead of based on elec-
tronic medical records (EMR).13 General practitioners 
(GPs) do not receive external (financial) support for 
EMR implementation; they bear the running elec-
tronic system costs themselves. There is evidence for 
technical assistance and financial incentives alongside 
EMR implementation being able to improve quality of 
care,14 15 at least modestly concerning improvements 
in cardiovascular care processes and outcomes.16 Also, 
combining a feedback mechanism alongside with EMR 
implementation and therefore providing users with 
near-term benefits from maintaining good data as well 
as financial incentives have shown to be promising 
approaches in promotion of EMR implementation in 
primary care.17–22
The Institute of Primary Care of the University and 
University Hospital of Zurich founded the research 
network FIRE (Family medicine ICPC Research using 
EMRs)23 with currently 290 GPs voluntarily documenting 
their consultations in an EMR using the International 
Classification of Primary Care (ICPC-2) coding system.24 
The anonymised structured medical routine data are 
uploaded to a server of the Institute and available for anal-
ysis. A previous study has shown that the FIRE database 
offers a valuable base for the calculation of QI according 
to the QOF in patients with diabetes.25
With the current study, we aim to test a P4P approach 
in Swiss primary care using clinical routine data in a 
cluster RCT. Our hypothesis is that a financial incentives 
increases GPs achievements of QIs in patients with diabetes 
more effectively than evidence-based educational feedback 
reports. Since the impact of clinical parameters on prog-
nosis of diseases is higher than the simple fact whether 
or not for example, blood pressure was measured, we will 
include two different approaches; one incentivising a clin-
ical parameter (blood pressure control) and in the other 
incentivising a process parameter (the measurement of 
glycated haemoglobin (HbA1c)).
MEthods And AnAlysIs
outcome-Parameter
Over the entire study period, we aim to investigate the 
following effects of implementing P4P in Swiss primary 
care practices:
1. Effect of P4P on QI achievement in comparison to 
feedback reporting (by randomisation into an inter-
vention and control group, where both groups receive 
feedback reporting, but only the intervention group 
receives a financial incentive).
2. Difference of P4P on process (measurement of HbA1c) 
versus clinical QIs (blood pressure control).
3. P4P effect on non-incentivised QIs (lipid status mea-
surements and levels).
4. Sustainability of P4P (extended observation period 24 
months after study start and 12 months beyond incen-
tives, respectively).
The QIs thresholds in our project are based on the expe-
rience of the Swiss QOF25 and the latest version of the QOF 
of the British NHS.26 For the threshold of the clinical QI 
blood pressure control, we refer to the latest recommenda-
tion of the European Society of Cardiology for the manage-
ment of arterial hypertension in patients with diabetes.27 
Indicator achievement will be expressed as percentage of 
patients meeting the indicator (numerator) in reference 
to all eligible patients (denominator). The primary and 
secondary outcomes are summarised in table 1.
study design
The study is a cluster-randomised, two-armed interven-
tion study based on the FIRE database, with the practice 
as the unit of randomisation. The practice at the level 
of randomisation was chosen to avoid contamination 
Table 1 Outcome parameters
Primary outcomes Parameter
  Clinical QI Proportion of patients with 
diabetes with last blood pressure 
measurement <140/85 mm Hg in 
the preceding 12 months
  Process QI Proportion of patients with diabetes 
with at least one measurement of 
HbA1c in the preceding 12 months
Secondary outcomes
  Process QI Proportion of patients with diabetes 
with at least one blood pressure 
measurement in the preceding 
12 months
  Clinical QI Proportion of patients with diabetes 
with HbA1c levels <7.5% in the 
preceding 12 months
  Process QI Proportion of patients with diabetes 
with at least one cholesterol 
measurement in the preceding 
12 months
  Clinical QI Proportion of patients with diabetes 
with total cholesterol <5 mmol/L in 
the preceding 12 months.
HbA1c, glycated haemoglobin; QI, quality indicator. 
 o
n
 2 July 2018 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/
BM
J O
pen: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-023788 on 30 June 2018. Downloaded from 
3Meier R, et al. BMJ Open 2018;8:e023788. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-023788
Open access
of intervention. The study flow chart is presented in 
figure 1.
dAtA CollECtIon
The FIRE database of the Institute of Primary Care, 
University of Zurich will provide the database for this 
study. Up to December 2017, 290 GPs from 14 German-
speaking cantons of Switzerland participated in the FIRE 
project. In December 2017, the database contained data 
of 3 372 343 encounters of 345 811 patients.
It consists of following data components:
 ► Administrative data (year of birth, gender, dates of 
each consultation and unique anonymised patient 
identification number).
 ► Vital signs: systolic and blood pressure, pulse, height, 
weight and waist circumference.
Figure 1 Flow chart of the study. DB-patients, patients with diabetes; FIRE, Family Medicine ICPC Research using Electronic 
Medical Record; GP, general physician; PI, process indicator.
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 ► ICPC-2: between one to seven codes for reason for 
encounter and diagnoses per contact date as assessed 
by the GP.
 ► Laboratory values: haemoglobin, leucocytes, C reac-
tive protein, erythrocyte sedimentation rate, creati-
nine, total cholesterol, high-density lipoprotein 
cholesterol and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, 
triglycerides, glutamat-oxalacetat-transaminase (aspar-
tate aminotransferase), glutamat-pyruvat-transami-
nase (alanine aminotransferase), gamma-glutamyl 
transferase, fasting glucose, HbA1c, prostate-specific 
antigen and so on; all values including their reference 
range and date of analysis.
 ► Medication data: Anatomical Therapeutic Chem-
ical Classification, medication doses, in-take time 
(morning, noon, evening and night-time), cessation 
date and comments.
 ► Structural data on participating GP practices (physi-
cians’ age and training, practice type (single-handed, 
double or group practice), location and laboratory 
connection), which are collected at individual project 
entry.
sample size
For the process QI (HbA1c) we assume an improvement 
from currently 70% adherence to 85% with a power of 
90%. For the clinical QI (proportion of patients with 
controlled blood pressure defined as <140/85 mm Hg) we 
assume a lower increase and calculated with an improve-
ment from currently 45% to 56%.25 We account for a 
cluster effect of 0.04. For the process QI (HbA1c), we will 
need 70 clusters and 6  observations per cluster (total of 
418 patients). For the clinical QI (blood pressure) we will 
need 70 clusters and an average of 26 observations per 
cluster (total of 1804 patients). We will therefore include 
70 GPs in in our study.
recruitment of GPs and randomisation
GPs are eligible if the data set is complete for all 12 months 
in 2017 and a minimum threshold of 0.1 is achieved for 
the process indicators of HbA1c and blood pressure, to 
rule out technical problems.
The level of randomisation will be on the practice 
level. The participating practices will be divided into an 
intervention and control group. Current performance 
status (clinical QI blood pressure), number of GPs per 
practice, details of network participation of the prac-
tice and number of patients with diabetes will be used 
to stratify randomisation. In contrast to the UK,4 we do 
not expect relevant social differences in the Swiss study 
population28; we therefore will not stratify according 
to geographical region, urban versus suburban GPs, 
respectively.
Patient inclusion criteria
Primary care patients with diabetes mellitus will be identi-
fied from the FIRE database according to the following 
criteria:
1. Patients with ICPC-2 codes T89 (insulin-dependent di-
abetes mellitus) and T90 (insulin-independent diabe-
tes mellitus).
2. Patients with antidiabetic medication (oral antidiabet-
ics and/or insulin) according to the pharmaceutical 
cost group (PCG) (A10A/A10B/A10X).29
Intervention
Both the intervention and control group will receive 
intensified feedback reports on the characteristics of their 
current patients with diabetes, including last data of blood 
pressure and HbA1c measurements. Moreover, excerpts 
of current diabetes treatment guidelines will be provided 
within the feedback report as recommendations.
After randomisation, GPs in the intervention group will 
additionally be informed that they will receive a financial 
incentive after 12 months for increasing achievements 
regarding the following two QI:
1. Percentage of patients with diabetes with blood pres-
sure <140/85 mm Hg (clinical QI).
2. Percentage of patients where HbA1c was measured 
within the last 12 months (process QI).
At baseline, the percentage of patients meeting 
criteria of each QI will be measured. After one year, the 
percentage of patients meeting the QI will again be 
measured. For each improved percentage point, GPs 
in the intervention group will be entitled to a singular 
payment of 75 Swiss francs. GPs in the control group will 
not receive a financial incentive and will not be informed 
about the provision of incentives in the intervention 
group. The intervention stops 12 months after baseline, 
bimonthly intensified feedback reports will continue for 
another 12 months. Twenty-four months after baseline, 
performance will be measured again in order to estimate 
long-term effects of the incentive and the evidence-based 
feedback reports.
data analysis
In a first step, we will perform a retrospective analysis of 
patient characteristics and GP QI achievements 12 months 
before inclusion. This analysis will allow an estimation of 
increasing QI achievements over time despite any finan-
cial incentive, as described in previous studies.30–32
The primary and secondary outcomes 12 and 24 
months after randomisation will be compared using 
random effects logistic regression analysis with the indi-
vidual as the unit of analysis. The GPs and practices will 
be included as the random effect to control for the effects 
of clustering.
EthICs And dIssEMInAtIon
description of risk
Participants will only be exposed to the usual care of 
their medical provider, which is generally expected to 
be best practice even in a non-study setting. Participants 
taking part might notice and benefit from an improved 
quality of care as the participating GPs are motivated to 
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reach higher achievements regarding the QI. No risks are 
expected.
Patient and public involvement
Patients were not involved in the process of writing the 
protocol. Public was involved through the governmental 
funder.
Ethical principles
According to the Local Ethics Committee of the Canton 
of Zurich, the project does not fall under the scope of the 
law on human research and therefore no ethical consent 
is necessary (BASEC-Nr. Req-2017-00797).
dissemination plan
A first manuscript with the results of the intervention 
phase will be published in a peer-reviewed journal after 
the first 12 months. A second manuscript will also be 
published in a peer-reviewed journal after the completion 
of the whole study, covering the sustainability of P4P.
data sharing statement
The data are gathered within the ongoing FIRE project. 
Additional data that are regularly gathered are stored in 
the FIRE database. The FIRE database can be accessed 
at any time by the scientific team of the institute. For 
external requests, access has to be requested from the 
head of the institute.
dIsCussIon
The introduction of QOF in UK’s NHS suggested 
improvement of all QI. However, it is unclear to which 
amount the financial incentives or the general increase 
in evidence-based medicine account for this improve-
ment, since no control group existed in this nationwide 
system change. RCTs in the field of P4P are scarce and 
often deal with preventive services, particularly immu-
nisation1 33 or originate from very different healthcare 
systems outside Europe or the USA.10 11 There is particu-
larly scarce research on the impact of financial incentives 
on prescribing behaviour of GPs.34 Moreover, it must be 
acknowledged that most RCTs in this context originate 
from the United Kingdom and the United States. Also, the 
implementation success of P4P has been shown to highly 
depend on environmental factors such as geograph-
ical region, practice forms, healthcare funding sources, 
general oversupply or undersupply of medical resources 
and so on.3 35 So, study results might not be applicable to 
differing healthcare systems such as in Switzerland.
This RCT will allow to directly observe the impact of 
a financial incentives on evidence-based QIs in patients 
with diabetes, comparing both a process and a clinical QI. 
We furthermore include the analysis of a QI not directly 
targeted by financial incentives, in order to assess the 
indirect impact of a P4P programme to improve cardio-
vascular risk in patients with diabetes.36 Additionally, the 
study includes a retrospective analysis to assess the base-
line performance and a long-term follow-up in order to 
disentangle general time trends related to QI changes 
and to investigate the added value of the P4P intervention 
as well as long-term effects of P4P programmes. Following 
the proof of concept that the leading EMR software in 
Switzerland contain enough data to collect informa-
tion for a QOF25 the current study will provide the first 
evaluation of Swiss physicians’ susceptibility to financial 
incentives. To our knowledge, this would be the first study 
assessing a P4P approach in primary care using an RCT 
in Switzerland.
Currently the Swiss healthcare system is undergoing 
massive transformations concerning reimbursement 
models. In the inpatient setting, the ‘diagnoses related 
groups’ (DRG) system has been implemented in 2012 
according to the German DRG system. In the outpatient 
setting a revision of the reimbursement system (TARMED) 
is currently under way, consisting of a slight qualitative 
improvement of GP’s reimbursement compared with 
other medical specialties while limiting certain positions 
quantitatively. This latest revision has been introduced 
against the opposition of the Swiss Medical Association. 
On the other hand, health insurance companies are 
looking for new reimbursement models and QIs to differ-
entiate among the very heterogeneous GP networks. The 
question, how reimbursement systems should be adapted 
is therefore a pressing issue. Evidence-based answers to 
this question are urgently needed. In order to provide 
stakeholders with an adequate basis of information and 
for a sound political decision-making process, it is essen-
tial to have a scientific knowledge based on the quality 
provided in primary care practices.
In conclusion, this study will provide a knowledge base 
for the ongoing political discussion on whether the imple-
mentation of P4P is a useful and realistic approach to 
improve care for patients with chronic diseases in primary 
care. This study might have a major impact on healthcare 
reimbursement models.
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